...the best part is, there's a three page thread on one forum promoting this EXE stuffed to bursting point with people saying "thank you" for the download.
Har-de-har.






It contains the usual nonsense designed to make the victim sit around doing nothing while the phisher changes their login information:























Luring you in with the promise of an official @dreamcast.com Email address, they asked for your serial number, desired username, password and a current Email address. Once registered, you would end up with a seemingly valid yourserialnumber@user.dreamcast.com address.
The only problem, of course, was that it wasn't SEGA sending out your details, it was the scammer who had grabbed the domain name. The theory is that people would likely use the same password for their desired Dreamcast address as the alternate Email address they provided when signing up to the "service". Thus, you would have spam lists and hijacked email addresses galore.
It didn't take long before SEGA denounced the site, and it was pulled offline shortly after. In retrospect, a dead giveaway should have been the fact that the site had Google Ads and a few other things on it (check out the rather small screenshot) that probably wouldn't have been there if SEGA had actually been in charge. SEGA almost certainly wouldn't have had a Play-Asia affiliate code embedded in the page, for that matter:

Today I received an interesting phish that only caught my eye purely because of a chance circumstance involving my credit card. What I ended up with was three websites (at least one of which has likely been hacked), two phishes and a collection of screenshots for you to look at after the jump...
I swear these programs keep getting smaller. Weighing in at around 30 kb, one of the newer automated phish creation programs currently in circulation. Behold, a strange cube icon on your desktop:

Run the program, and you end up with a devastatingly idiot proof phish creation tool. In a nutshell, you enter the URL of the site you want to target and also the place where your phish script is located. It sucks down the content of the target site and jumbles it up with your phish script - hey presto, one Phish page ready to roll.
Facebook...
Myspace...
And, just to show that it will suck down pretty much any site you enter, here's Google search engine...
On the bright side, this one doesn't come with spoken help files...
Subject: Dear Webmail Subscriber Confirm Your Account.
Body: "Dear Webmail Subscriber,
To complete your Webmail account, you must reply to this email
immediately and enter your password here (*********)
Failure to do this will immediately render your email address
deactivated from our database.
You can also confirm your email address by logging into your webmail account.
Thank you for using!
THE SUPPORT TEAM
WEBMAIL SUPPORT
Confirm Your E-mail Address"
I see some poor phish mails, but this one doesn't even attempt to make sense. Not only is it a bad idea to tell someone to "confirm their account" when they've already been using it for four years(!), telling them they can "confirm their email address by logging into your account" is sort of redundant considering they'd have to be in it in the first place to see the mail. They don't even link to a phish page - the mail might as well just say SEND US YOUR LOGIN, THANKS!
Oh wait, it does.
A quick Google search on the domain extension for the Email used in this scam (@j-mail.info) reveals a prior history with regards email missives. Fake lotteries, grant awards, 419 references - as always, steer clear.
I'd been watching the antics of a 20 year old girl from Malaysia who had a serious thing for Phishing. I couldn't have predicted the direction the investigation would take when, quite randomly, I came across the following post with regards one of her former identities:

...."Ribut", eh? Interesting. A quick Google search later, and we find some interesting Ribut-related Phish pages:

...don't bother to look for it, I already had it killed off. What really intrigued me here was if she had any more pages floating around under her "old" username. Using a few search strings that tend to reveal some of the more "obvious" password-stealing fake logins via Google, I stumbled across a rather unusual way of keeping an eye on Phish pages:

There she is, buried in a pile of other phish pages. What is that a screenshot of, I hear you ask? And why exactly is she buried in a wall of phish? Well, note the title - "Where can I find these ads?"
This is a page from advertising network Adbrite, who the host of all these phish pages (2222mb.com) has an account with. If someone wants to host an advert on 2222mb.com, they make their selection and purchase ad space:
However, this isn't the part of the page we're interested in. You've already seen it, above, listing the "most trafficked pages" from the site in question. That's right, it appears that the most popular pages on 2222mb.com are phish pages, going off the information presented to us by Adbrite.
In fact, here's a snapshot of the current set of pages listed by Adbrite as "most trafficked pages":

...is anyone else faintly disturbed that EVERYTHING being listed for this webhost is almost always a phish page?
At this point, you normally contact the host and (depending on a whole range of factors) they kill off the rogue pages in a few days or so. My hopes were high, seeing as another host (110mb.com) with the same Admin contact (a person called Tycho Luyben, more on him later) had previously removed phish pages for me in as little as six minutes.
My first mistake, as it turns out, was getting my hopes up.
The above is the frontpage of 2222mb.com. At the bottom of the page, it mentions Terms of Service, but you can't click into it. There is no contact email address anywhere on site, and no mention of what to do when finding evidence of abuse on the network.
Uh-oh.
As it turns out, the only way to try and get someones attention was to register for the hosting service, then submit a ticket which......was completely ignored by whoever received it.
> http://dustyd34th.2222mb.com/myspace.php
> http://ribut.2222mb.com/myspace.php
> http://najn.2222mb.com/
> http://tjt1991.2222mb.com/myspace.php
> http://darktornadic.2222mb.com/myspace/myspace.php
> http://english-naats.2222mb.com/index.htm
> http://titan7.2222mb.com/myspace.php
....were all reported on the 21st of January, and a few days later, nobody had replied to my ticket. So much for the "24 / 7" support - I added to the ticket a few days later (with words to the effect of, "these pages still appear to be live"?) and that was ignored too.
Okay, change of plan. Let's go to the guy who must be providing these reseller accounts to these webhosts in the first place. A quick check of the whois data for 2222mb reveals....something weird, actually. The other hosting services that are presumably reseller accounts provided to individuals by "Tycho" have different addresses listed, as you would expect (110mb.com, for example, is owned by someone in Australia). With 2222mb.com though, Tychos own "Admin Contact" address is listed as the main contact address for this domain.
owner-contact: O-EZL21
owner-organization: E-lab BV
owner-street: Weverstede 27 b
owner-city: Nieuwegein
owner-zip: 3431 JS
owner-country: NL
owner-phone: +31 615065229
owner-email: tycho@e-lab.nl
Is the owner of this reseller account living with Tycho or something? Could it be Tycho himself? It seems unlikely, given that Tycho replied to my first email to him (sent on the Tenth of February) with the following:
"Dear,
I will tell my client to remove these asap.
Regards,
Tycho"
...."My Client"? Okay, so why is his own Admin address listed as the primary contact point for this domain when someone else apparently owns it?
Anyway, all of the above phish pages were deleted - but I had a second, final batch of pages that needed to be deleted too. As anything and everything sent to abuse@2222mb.com and postmaster@2222mb.com went unanswered, I thought I'd better send Tycho another email. He'd fix those too, right?
Wrong.
Three more emails, sent on the 11th, 13th and 15th of February went unanswered - as did the second round of tickets raised inside the 2222mb system:
Two of the above phish pages have since gone offline, but it seems unlikely that I had anything to do with it, given that all the rest are still online and happily phishing away. I thought I'd check out the E-Lab site attached to Tychos email address - here's where things spiral into madness:
Note the "www" at the start of the web address. So far, so good - nothing out of the ordinary. Just a page that talks about helping people "start out" online with regards technology based ventures and the like.
However - type in the address minus the "www" and look what happens:
...you're redirected to a site called "Stoopidsh*t.com" that contains links to numerous "extreme / crazy" videos, and also a number of videos that require you to install Zango to play them (they're the ones with the red "play video" buttons).
Apart from the fact that it's a little odd for a site acting as some kind of provider for web services to redirect to something like that, can you guess who the site is registered to?
I have no idea what's going on with that whois data, but it looks a little strange, right? S4V 3C5 is merely a postcode - where is the rest of the address?
Actually, that's not the only website connected to Tycho that looks a little odd in a whois search. Take, for example, the whois for a site called "Riddleman.net":

....I'm sure you'll agree, that's a pretty strange looking contact address. At any rate, I think we're done poking around the weird and wonderful world of domain registrations. Time to contact Adbrite and let them know anyone going looking for either
a) 2222mb.com information via Google or
b) more information regarding Myspace phish pages on 2222mb.com via Google
are (more often than not) going to see Adbrite pages appear before anything else, usually listing some phishing pages in their own "most trafficked pages results:
Now to me, having your own pages pop up when searching for someone else's phish pages is a form of negative association you could do without - both in terms of not wanting to be associated with such a thing, and also not wanting to be seen to be providing a way to generate money for webhosts that don't seem to be overly speedy with regards removing network abuse.
Surely, when notified about such antics you'd be quick to take action, right? At the very least, you might want to drop the person running your ads a note and suggest that a housecleaning might be in order, lest your account be canceled?
Well, that's what I thought too. However, the emails sent to Adbrite on both the 17th and the 22nd of February have (so far) not had a response from either pr@adbrite.com or support@adbrite.com (note that I only sent Adbrite details of 2222mb.com and the way that requests for phishing pages to be removed were seemingly ignored - they were not sent any additional information regarding other domains, which although interesting, were irrelevant to the point I wanted to raise with Adbrite).
I would hope that Adbrite will take a second look at this and take appropriate action if needed - 2222mb.com has already gained a form of notoriety on hacking / cracking forums as a good place to host phishing pages. Indeed, look at the results from this search...there are many hacking sites distributing tutorials recommending 2222mb.com for phish hosting.
Take those tutorials and combine them with the experiences I had simply trying to get a handful of phish pages taken offline and you have the makings of a problem that is going to grow and grow unless something is done about it.
The question is, is anybody listening and do they actually care?
After hearing a few reports of Skype Phishing these past few days, one of my colleagues happened to come across the below site:
Phishing is a form of criminal activity using social engineering or trickster techniques to fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy person or business in an apparently official electronic communication, such as an email or an instant message. The term phishing arises from the use of increasingly sophisticated lures to "fish" for users' financial information and passwords. Some phishing has become so complicated that it no longer needs to steal information from the web, IM or E-mail, but lure users to use phone connections and capture them using phone techniques. (You call a number, they ask you to enter in your account number and PIN and viola- they capture the "tones" made by your telephone keypad input and your account is wide open to the scammer.)
We talked a while ago about the global phishing termination operation launched by CastleCops and Sunbelt Software. The volunteer PIRT Squad is comprised of folks who report phish, investigate phish, and actively work on phish takedown and termination (original concept by Robin Laudanski). PIRT is funded by CastleCops.
Our own Microsoft Security MVP, Chris Boyd, has been participating on the PIRT Squad over at CastleCops and some of the first results are in. CastleCops' operators, Robin and Paul Laundanski, have compiled the list of the top phished brands in May. Here the all-volunteer group of phishing terminators has been having a real impact on phishing. Our own research team follows-up on many of these phish sites and note that many are offline quickly! That is good news...but the battle is far from over. (Other "things" may lurk on the end of these phish attempts, but that is for another entry.)
So without further ado the top brands fished in May:
Pay special attention to how "pure Internet play" brands like PayPal and eBay are the most common targets.
May 2006 confirmed phish (brand plus total count for May):
PayPal - 520
eBay - 309
Bank of America - 37
Barclays - 36
Wells Fargo - 36
Chase - 33
WAMU - 28
HSBC - 20
MasterCard - 18
e-gold - 17
Nationwide - 17
Citi - 16
BancorpSouth - 14
Postbank.de - 12
Halifax - 11
NetBank - 11
Laredo Nat'l Bank - 10
Nat'l Australia Bank - 10
Western Union - 10
National Credit Union - 9
With this early report in mind we have to take into account that Google is now throwing their hat into the e-commerce ring with a service called "Google Checkout". The business implications of this move are very, very complicated and beyond the scope of this entry- although they are important to security researchers too. However, in terms of pure security research the proverbial writing is on the wall...Google and e-commerce will only attract scammers like bears to honey. How successful they will be will depend much on how Google implements the process, their anti-fraud features, and how educated people are on phishing in general.
I admit, especially in my talks and speeches with youngsters, I am quite dismayed at the lack of awareness on Internet safety. That is one area I, and our team, have been pondering.
One of the best forms of defense is very simply- "street smarts". For example, we teach children not to go into dark alleys late at night, actually most parents wouldn't let their children out in a city at night! Yet our digital highways can be dangerous too- often the mediums are treated differently. I plan more on this in the future.
For now, us get back to Google Checkout.
Some of the features of Google Checkout include:
1) Google will store your complete shopping history. This is convenient of course, but remember if you lose access to that account- that history goes with you. This is no different than losing access via a hack to any e-mail account.
2) Google won't share your full credit card number, even with the merchants you buy from. This makes sense, since Google is doing the transaction on behalf of the merchant.
3) Google won't share your email address with merchants if you don't want them to. This is nice- you don't have to worry about getting lots of promotions via e-mail if you don't want.
4) Google will not spam you. Google pledges they will not spam you- great. They never have and I believe that is not in their plans.
5) You can store as many credit cards in Google Checkout as you want! That is where it starts to get a little bit risky.
Now, again, I am not being anti-Google, I am only being a realist. You have a pure play Internet brand, new to offering payment transaction processing to the public at large, prepared to do business en masse. If we look at recent history, like the PIRT report, it only stands to reason that Google, other privacy concerns aside, will experience their fair share of phishing attempts.
For now- use "street smarts". Be wary and be careful.
NOTE: If you are technically adept at handling phishing attempts and want to help by joining the PIRT Squad you can join the team here, if you simply want to report a phishing attempt you can do so by clicking here.
Phishing is a form of criminal activity using social engineering or trickster techniques to fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy person or business in an apparently official electronic communication, such as an email or an instant message. The term phishing arises from the use of increasingly sophisticated lures to "fish" for users' financial information and passwords.
Phishing attempts that target employees of an particular company are often called "Spear Phishing". There is a current bill called the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 now under debate and other community-driven methods are underway to attack phishers like the Phried Phish project from Castlecops where you can submit phishing address and skilled hunters will go after them and get them shutdown!
Coming soon...a bevy of tools and techniques to help protect your self from phishing.
"Virgin Atlantic can confirm that the website www.virrgin-atlanticsairways-uk.com has been shut down.
The website was associated with a recruitment phishing scam. Virgin Atlantic is in no way associated with this scam and would never offer to ask members of the public to part with money in applying for a career at the airline.
At Virgin Atlantic we take these matters very seriously. We have reported this matter to the Police and have been successful in clamping down on the scam, by closing down associated websites, telephone numbers and email addresses.
To look for legitimate recruitment opportunities with Virgin Atlantic Airways, please visit http://www.virgin-atlantic.com/careers
Virgin Atlantic"
Kudos to Virgin Atlantic for actively pursuing the offending website - it doesn't always pan out like that...